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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC COAS'T TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HARTFORD AC'CIDENT & 
- INDEMNITY COMPANY 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8719 
BRIEF OF PACIFIC COAST TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, RE·SPONDEN:T 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
Respondent, Pacific Coast Title Insurance Com-
pany, adopts generally Appellant's .statement of 
facts, but must add certain matters omitted. This 
case was consolidated for trial with two other cases 
likewise involving suits against Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Company and all arising out of the 
same Contract Bond (Ex. Pr-1) which reads as fol-
lows, (Appellant quoted only certain portions): 
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That We, CASSADY COMPANY, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, and C. P. CASSADY of 
Arcadia, California, (hereinafter called the 
PRINICIPAL) and HARTFORD ACCIDENT 
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, with its principal office in Hartford, 
Connecticut, and authorized to transact sur-
ety business in the State of Utah, (hereinafter 
called the SUREITY) are held and firmly 
'bound and obligated unto PRUDENTIAL 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-
CIATION, a corporation of the United States 
of America, (hereinafter called LENDER 
OBLIGEE) and unto FELT SYNDICATE, 
a corporation of the State of Utah, (herein-
after called the OWNER OBLIGEE), and 
unto PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation of the State of 
Utah (hereinafter called TITLE OBLIGEE), 
as their respective interests may appear as 
obligees in the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED 
SIXTY THREE THOUSAND AND N'0/100 
( $76'3,000.00) DOLLARS lawful money of 
the United States of America, for the payment 
of which PRIN'CIP AL AND SURETY bind 
themselves, their heirs, executors, administra-
tors, successors, and assigns, jointly and sev-
erally, firmly by these presents. 
WHEREAS, the PRINCIPAL has en-
tered into a contract with the OWNER OB-
LIGEE for the construction of dwelling 
houses and appurtenant improvements in a 
housing project known and designated as 
Morningside Heights Subdivision, located in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, which contract is by 
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WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE 
has agreed to lend to each qualified borrower, 
upon the security of a first lien mortgage, a 
sum of money to be used in the construction 
of a dwelling house and appurtenant improve-
ments upon a lot in said housing project own-
ed by the borrower; and 
WHEREA~s, the funds loaned by the 
LENDER OBLIGEE on the security of said 
first lien mortgage will be used with the con-
·sent of the borrower in making payments due 
the PRINCIPAL under said contract; and 
WHEREAS, the TTTLE OBLIGEE will 
issue A:TA title insurance policies on· each lot 
or parcel of real estate upon which the LEN-
DER OBLIGEE makes a mortgage toan as 
herein stated; and · 
WHEREA·S, the LENDER OBLIGEE, 
TITLE OBLIGEE, and OWNER OBLIGEE 
each desire protection as their interests may 
appear, in event of default by the PRINCI-
pAL under said contract, said protection to 
be subject to the performance by the LEN-
DER OBLIGEE, the TITLE OBLIGEE, and 
the OWNER OBLIGEE of their respective 
obligations to the PRINCIPAL in connection 
with said contract; 
NOW, THERE.FORE, the condition of 
this obligation is such that if the PRINCIPAL 
well and truly performs all the undertakings, 
covenants, conditions and agreements·of said 
contract on its part and fully indemnifies 
and saves harmless the obligees from all loss, 
sost, damage, and expense which they may 
suffer, either jointly and severally, by reason 
of failure so to do, and fully reimburse and 
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repays obligees all outlay and expense which 
said obligees may incur in making good any 
such default; and, further, if the PRINCI-
pAL shall pay all persons who have contract-
ed, or will have contracted, directly with 
PRINICIP AL for services or labor or materi-
als- furnished under the provisions of said 
contract, and shall keep and maintain each 
lot or building-site free and clear of labor and 
material liens, then this obligation shall be 
void; otherwise, it s'hall remain in full force 
and effect. 
The foregoing, however, is su·bject to the 
following provisions : 
1. The LENDER OBLIGEE shall have 
prior right and lien under this Bond as against 
the other o~bligees herein named. 
2. 'The SURE.TY and PRINCIPAL 
agree that, in the event the PRINCIPAL shall 
default in the performance of the undertak-
ings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agree-
ments of said contract on its part, the SUR-
ETY will have the option to cure and remedy 
said default and complete performance of said 
contract. 
3. The SURETY shall not be liable un-
der this Bond to t~e Obligees, and either of 
them, unless the Obligees, or either of them, 
shall make payment to the PRINCIPAL in 
reasonable compliance with the terms of said 
contract as to payments, and each shall per-
form all other obligations to be performed by 
each Obligee under said contract at the time 
and in the manner therein set forth. 
4. !The SURETY agrees that any right 
of action or clain1 that either of the Obligees 
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herein might have under this Bond may be 
subordinated to the other, and that such sub-
ordination will in no manner invalidate or 
qualify this Bond. The SURETY further 
agrees to recognize any such agreement of 
subordination and priority upon being fur-
nished with signed evidence thereof. · 
5. No- suit, action, or proceeding by 
of any default, whatever, shall be brought on 
this Bond after two ('2) years ·from the date 
on which the final payr.aent under the con-
tract falls due, provided, however, that in the 
event there exists or is pending any collateral 
litigation which has the effect of making it 
impossible for any Obligee under this Bond to 
determine its rights hereunder, a suit, action, 
or other proceeding under this Bond may be 
instituted within six (6) months after entry 
of final judgment in said collateral litigation. 
6. The prior written approval of SUR-
ETY shall be required with regard to any 
changes or alterations in said contract where 
the cost thereof, added to prior changes or 
alterations, causes the aggregate cost- of all 
changes and alterations to exceed 10 per cent 
of the original contract price; but, except as 
to the foregoing, any alterations which may 
be made in the terms of the contract, or in the 
work to 'be done under it, or the giving by the 
Obligees of any extensions of time for the 
performance of the contract, or any other 
forbearance on the part of either the Obligees 
or PRINCIPAL to the other, shall not in any 
way release SURETY or PRINCIP A,L of the 
obligations of this instrument, notice of SUR-
ETY of any such alterations, extensions, or 
forbearance being hereby waived. 
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7. The aggregate liability of SURETY 
hereunder to the Obligees or their assigns is 
limited to the penal sum above stated, and 
SURETY, upon making any payment here-
under shall be subrogated to, and shall be en-
titled to an assignment of, all rights of the 
payee, either against PRINCIPAL or against 
any other party liable to the payee in con-
nection with the loss which is the su'bject of 
the payment. 
SIGNED, SEALED AND DATED 
21st day of July, 1950. 
PREMIUM ON THIS 
BOND IS $7,630.00 
CAS'SADY COMPANY, INC 
By /s/ C. P. Cassady 
/s/ C. P. Cassady 
C. P. Cassady . 
HAR:TFORD ACCIDENT AND 
INDEMNITY COMPANY 
By jsj A. L. Blackburn 
A. L. Blackburn, 
Attorney-in-Fact'' 
The reason for this bond was that one hundred 
mortgage loans were necessary to finance the Morn-
ingside Heights project. Prudential would not loan 
the money unless Title Company would insure their 
100 mortgages (as yet unexecuted and the mort-
gagors unknown) as first liens as required by its 
correspondent Prudential Insurance Company of 
America and the U. S. Veterans Administration. 
The Title Company would not insure the mortgages 
as first liens, as and when executed, because work 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had been started on some of the subdivision lots. 
Thus a bond was required where ·not· only the then 
ov1ner (Felt) was an obligee but also Prudential 
and the 1Title Company had to be obligees or no 
A.T.A. policies of title insurance would have been 
issued on the proposed mortgages. 
The financing program was such that indivi-
dual loans were to be made to veteran purchasers 
of the lots in Morningside Heights an·d until and 
when each lot had been sold, a note and mortgage 
executed, the proposed veteran-borrower approved 
by the lending institution and the U. S. Veterans 
Administration, the mortgage actually recorded and 
the A-T-A policy of title insurance issued, Pruden-
tial had no right or duty to dis·burse any funds. This 
same procedure had to be repeated 100 times as such 
was a prerequisite to the disbursing of funds on each 
and all of the 100 separate loans and all were ad-
visedin advance of such requirements. 
Appellant's statement of facts reflects that 
problems arose between the Cassadys as contractors, 
the suppliers of materials, Felt Syndicate and Pru-
dential throughout the last five months of 1950. In 
compromise settlement of such difficulties, the con-
tractor, Cassady, which had agreed to complete all 
100 houses within 180 days from July 19, 1950 
(Exh. PR-2), sought and received an extension of 
time for completion up to June 1, 1951. 'This was 
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by ''Supplemental Agreement" dated February 16, 
1951 (Exh. PR-6). 
In partial recognition of delays and the in-
crease of costs and in an apparent effort to com-
promise the claims made by Cassady as to Felt's 
responsibility therefor, this Supplemental Agree-
ment of February 16, 1951 in paragraph I of Article 
III -increased the price per house to be paid by Cass-
ady. The parties also confirmed and approved all 
disbursements of the funds paid by Prudential to 
Associated Accountants and then Felt, Cassady and 
Accountants "here·by irrevocably admit that they, 
and each of them, have secured from Prudential an 
accounting of the proceeds of all mortgage loans and 
down payments and the disbursal of same by Pru-
dential to the date hereof." And then they further, 
''hereby admit, agree and declare that Prudential 
has performed all of its obligations under said Pri-
mary Contract and Disbursing Contract and supple-
ment thereto dated the 2'2nd day of August 1950, 
from the respective dates thereof to the date of this 
Supplement Agreement." 
This said document (PR-6) extending the time 
of completion, estalblishing new disbursing proce-
dures and discretionary powers in Prudential and 
acknowledging the full accounting by Prudential to 
date, was then signed by all parties including Paci-
fic Coast Title Insurance Company as Title Obligee 
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and also by Hartford as the Surety Company. 
In this case there was a stipulation of facts 
('Title Co. R 11-13) which reads: 
"The parties hereto for the purpose of 
this proceeding, stipulate that the following 
facts may be received and considered by the 
Court as fully in the determination of th is-
sues herein along with other testimony as if 
such had been testified to directly by compe-
tent witnesses at the trial thereof. 
1. That plaintiff is a Utah corporation 
and at all times mentioned herein was and is 
duly licensed to engage in business as a title 
insurance company in the State of Utah. 
2. That the defendant, Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Company, is an insurance 
corporation having its principal office in 
Hartford, Connecticut, but is duly licensed 
to and is actually engaged in the transaction 
of a surety business in the State of Utah. 
3. That for the sum of $76'30.00 pre-
mium paid to the defendant, Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Company, the defendant 
executed and delivered a document designated 
as "·Contract Bond" dated July 21, 1950 for 
the sum of $763,000.00 in words and figures 
as shown by Exhibit No. 1 at Pretrial. 
4. ·That plaintiff was a party to said 
bond, designated as the "Title O·bligee". 
5. 'That said bon·d was issued in con-
junction with an agreement for the erection 
of one hundred dwelling houses and appurte-
nant improvements on one hundred lots in a 
su'bdivision of Salt Lake County, known and 
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designated as Morningside Heights Subdivi-
sion, whics said agreement is dated July 19, 
1950 and designated as pre-trial Exhibit No. 
2 and a loan agreement designated as Exhi-
bit No. 7 at pre-trial, dated June 16, 1950. 
6. That plaintiff issued A.T.A. policies 
of title insurance on each and all of the said 
one hundred lots and dwelling houses in 
Morningside Heights Subdivision as and when 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation completed a mortgage loan on each of 
said lots and plaintiff did show such mort-
gage as a first lien against the several lots 
without any exception for possible material 
men's, laborers', or subcontractors' liens 
against the property. T·he first policy was is-
sued August 15, 1950 and the last one on 
December 8, 1950. 
7. !That in fact the claims of material 
men, laborers and subcontractors were not 
paid by the principal and several lien claims 
and amended lien claims were filed against · 
the said one hundred lots in the Morningside 
Heights Subdivision and action. was brought 
in the District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, Utah to foreclose such lien claims, 
being Civil No. 98,351 entitled Welch Planing 
Mill, Inc. v. F.elt Syndicate, Inc. et al. 
8. ·That plaintiff did not handle the dis-
bursement or distribution of any of the funds 
involved in the construction of the premises, 
nor received any of the proceeds of the mort-
gages, except such sums as were paid to it 
through its agent, Security Title Company at 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for the regular pre-
miums on the insurance of the mortgages re-
ferred to above. 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9. That on August 2·7, 1953, written 
demand was duly made by the Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, as the 
mortgagee and holder of the said one hund-
red mortgages and the A. T .A. policies of title 
insurance, that plaintiff defend it and said 
n1ortgages against the litigation filed by lien 
claimants. 
10. That the plaintiff thereupon engag-
ed legal counsel and they appeared .in said 
litigation as counsel for Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Assn. in opposition to the 
liens so filed and in all phases thereof from 
about May, 1953 to and including October of 
1955, and has expended in such defense the 
sum of $3600.99 for expenses ~of depositions, 
attorneys' fees and court costs, all of which 
were reasonably necessary and proper and re-
lated to the defense against said material 
men's and subcontractors' liens. 
11. That the litigation, Civil No. 98351 
involved the proposed foreclosure of liens and 
amended liens filed by Welch Planing Mill, 
Inc., Standard Lumber Company, Garold E. 
Jackson, Star Plumbing and Heating Com-
pany, Inc., I. A. Thompson, Nu-Way Builders 
Supply Company an·d Elias Morris & Sons 
Company. Those lien claims and amended lien 
claims were compromised and settled the ac-
tions dismissed with prejudice on or a:bout 
October 5, 1955. 
12. 'That the monies paid to the lien 
claimants for such compromise settlements 
were advanced by Prudential Federal Savings 
& Loan Association and by Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Company and such settlement 
ll 
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was made with a full reservation of all rights 
between Felt Syndicate, Inc., Prudential Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association and Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co. That plaintiff's 
counsel participated in arranging said com-
promise settlement negotiations and signed the 
final stipulation therein on behalf of Pru-
dential Federal Savings & Loan Association. 
13. That no final adjudication was 
made as to any of the lien claims because of 
the compromise settlement of the litigation. 
14. That the litigation relating to the 
enforcement of the numerous liens, being 
Civil No. 98,351 as referred to above, was 
collateral litigation necessary to determine 
the extent and nature of the liens and plain-
tiff's rights under said Contract Bond and 
such was not completed until on or about 
October 4, 1955. 
15. That defendant has refused to re-
imburse plaintiff for its said expenses and 
costs in defending Civil No. 98,351." 
The issuance of the A-T-A policies of title in-
surance required that the property be inspected to 
ascertain whether any work had been commenced or 
materials delivered on the site prior to recording 
the mortgages. The examination of the title and the 
inspection of the premises was handled by Surety 
Title Company and it then issued a preliminary re-
port to Prudential to show the status of the titles 
and the mortgagability. Exh. Pac. 27 is such a pre-
liminary report on the 100 lots. It is dated June 22, 
12 
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1950 and on page 2 recites as an exception to mar-
ketability, "9. The construction of improvements 
having been commenced on said property, no liabi-
lity is assumed as to liens that may be filed in con-
nection with said improvements." 
Mr. Mark D. Eggertsen, President of Security 
Title Company (agent for Pacific Coast Title In-
surance Company) testified that they were request-
ed to write policies of title insurance on the 100 
mortgages as first liens granting "full coverage" 
but they would not do so normally without putting 
in an exception for possible rights of materialmen 
and laborers once construction was ·started ahead 
of the mortgages. They "would not issue a full 
coverage A. T .A. policy unless a bond was furnis·hed" 
(Tr. 170) because basements had already been dug. 
He then testified that they relied upon the -.bop<:} 
from Hartford in issuing the 100 policies on the 
Prudential mortgages without any exception for 
mechanics liens and materiaJmens liens. 
The loss sustained by this plaintiff represented 
attorneys fees, travel, depositions and similar costs 
and expenses relating to the defense of the priority 
of the 100 mortgages from the attack of material-
men who had filed liens against the 100 lots in Morn-
ingside Heights Subdivision. Defendant has stipu-
lated as to the amount of said costs and expenses. 
No claim is made that Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
13 
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Company at any time or in any manner breached 




THE FINDINGS AND- JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PACIFIC COAS'T TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT AND 
MATERIAL EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE BREACH OF THE CONTRACT BY FELT OR 
ANY o·THER PARTY, IF ANY, DOES NOT BARRE-
COVERY BY PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANICE 
COMPANY. 
POINT III 
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUC-
TION CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COM-
PROMISED AND SET'TLED ANY AND ALL PRIOR 
CLAIMED CONTRACT BREACHES BY THE SUPPLE-
MENTAL AGREEMEN-T OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS A COMPENSATED SURETY AND 
THE CONTRAC'T BOND MUST BE CONSTRUED MOST 
STRONGLY AGAINST THE SURETY. 
POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE LAW. 
14 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS AND JiUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY ARE 
SU'PPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, C·OMPETEN'f AND 
MATERIAL EVIDENCE. 
Appellant seems to take only one approach in 
opposing the Title Company's judgment. That is 
set fo:_"th in its Point VII wherein it asserts that 
the "1Title Company did not sustain any compens-
able damage ... " 'The last "Whereas" clause of 
the bond recites that "the Lender Obligee, Title 
Obligee and Owner Obligee each desire protection 
as their interests may appear, in the event of default 
by the principal under said con tract, . . . '' (under-
scoring ours) . 
Then the bond undertakes in the next para-
graph to indemnify and save harmless the obligees 
"from all loss, cost, damage, and expense which 
they may suffer ... " and further ties this obliga-
tion to the duty of the Principal (Cassady) to pay 
all persons who have contracted for labor or ma-
terials "and shall keep and maintain each lot and 
building site free and clear of labor and material 
1. '' 1ens .... 
The stipulation of facts set forth above in this 
case shows the filing of liens on the one hundred 
lots, the filing of a case, Civil No. 98,351 to fore-
15 
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close the liens, the demand by Prudential that the 
Title Company defend the first lien of the mortgage 
against the lien claims; and the expenditure of 
$3600.99 by the Title Company was "for expenses 
of depositions, attor11eys fees and court costs, all 
of which were reasonably necessary and proper and 
related to the defense against said materialr.aen's 
and subcontractors' liens.'' 
Can it be said that these costs of depositions, 
attorneys fees and court costs were not within the 
contemplation of the parties? These are the very 
things for which the Title Company sought, in part, 
protection by means of the bond. The filing of ma-
terialmen's liens and the necessity of defending the 
mortgages against the same or paying such were 
real threats in light of the fact that construction 
had been started on the project well in advance of 
the recording of any of the 100 mortgages. This was 
not a vague imagination as the record shows that 
work had been started by way of basement excava-
tions prior to the Title Company's preliminary re-
port on June 22, 1950 while the basic contract be-
tween Felt & Cassady was not executed until July 
19, 1951 and the Contract Bond guaranteeing its 
performance was not signed until July 21, 1951. 
Appellant has cited a few cases in which a de-
cision has stated that attorneys fees are not recover-
able unless a specific contractual provision so pro-
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vides. We feel that such cases are not in point under 
the type of bond here involved. This compensated 
surety, Hartford, has agreed to pay "allloss,es, cost, 
damage, and expense." 
Appellant's leading case is D,ahl v. Princ,e, 119 
Ut 556, 230 Pac. ( 2d) 328. This was a claim and 
delivery action for a Buick automobile in which the 
trial court found for the plaintiff and tacked on at-
torneys fees as a measure of the damages for the 
wrongful taking of plaintiff's car by defendant. The 
Supreme Court reversal of such a holding in a claim 
and delivery case may well be proper, but that is no 
precedent to deprive our plaintiff from recovery of 
deposition expenses, attorneys fees and court costs 
under a written agreement which bound Hartford 
to pay ,all loss, cost, damage and expense incurred 
by the Title Company. 
In, Patterson v. Rinard, 81 111 App 80, it was 
held that the obligees of an injunction bond could 
recover for the use of their attorneys for attorneys 
fees, since attorneys fees are "damages". 
The case of Employers' Indemnity Corporation 
v. Southwest Nat. Bank, Texas, 299 S.W. 676 in-
volved an action on a surety bond which agreed to 
save harmless, ... "against all loss, damage, liabi-
lity~ expense or costs ... " Some $5500.00 was ex-
pended on attorneys fees by the obligee and the Court 
17 
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awarded judgment not only for the original attor-
neys fees incurred but also for attorneys fees in re-
covering the attorneys fees. The appellate- court 
held that under the bond, attorneys fees were "dam-
age" and "expense". 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Swaner 
v. Union Mortgage Co. 105 Pac. (2d) 342, 99 Utah 
298 held that the word "damage" in conjunction with 
the defendant's failure to release a mortgage in-
cluded attorneys fees. The statute at issue, Sec. 78-
3-8, R.S.U .. 1933 authorized an award of "the costs 
of suit and all damages resulting from such a fail-
ure''. A careful analysis of the earlier holdings of 
your Court and of other states was made and then 
the opinion stated, "We believe that 'all damages' 
includes the damage one incurs when compelled to 
employ an attorney to bring legal action to pro-
cure a release of the mortgage." We note that the 
bond in our present case is much broader as it 
reads, "all loss, cost, damage, and expense". 
In another Utah case the word "expenses" was 
held to include attorneys fees. This was the con-
struction placed by your Court in Foreman v Fore-
man, 176 Pac (2d)_ 144, 111 Utah 72, on Sect.104-
5-11, U.C .. A. 1943 relating to "costs and expenses" 
in contempt proceedings. Other cases can be cited 
to further fortify our position that the language· 
of the present bond requiring payment of all loss, 
18 
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cost, damage and expense includes necessarily the 
attorneys fees and court costs expended in defend-
ing the insured n1ortgage3 against the lien claim-
ants; particularly when the bond and the prime con-
tract both contain specific promises that they shall 
keep each lot or building-site free and clear of la-
bor and material liens.'' 
This, a law case for brea~h of contract and 
the trial court's findings are supported by ade-
quate, competent and material evidence. In this 
case all basic facts were stipulated and the defen-
dant bonding company has never, and does not now, 
contend that the Title Company has in any manner 
breached its obligations under the bond or any other 
agreement. The reliance of the Title Company upon 
the bond as a condition precedent to the writing of 
the A.T.A. policies is undisputed in the evidence. 
The well established and oft repeated rule in 
Utah is that in a law case, such as the present one, 
where there is substantial, competent evidence to 
support the findings of the trial court, those find-
ings will not be disturbed: Knudsen Music v. Mas-
terson 121 Ut. 252, 240 Pac. (2d) 973. Also, -that 
the plaintiff, having prevailed in the trial Court, is. 
entitled to the benefit of having the evidence viewed 
in the light most favorable to him, together with 
every inference and intendment fairly and reason-
ably arising therefrom, McCollum v. Collier, 121 
Ut. 311, 241 Pac. (2d) 468. 
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POINT II 
THE BREACH OF THE CONTRACT BY FELT OR 
ANY OTHER PARTY, IF ANY, DOES NOT BAR RE-
COVERY BY PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
POINT III 
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUC-
TION CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COM-
PROMISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL PRIOR 
CLAIMED CONTRAC·T BREACHES BY THE SUPPLE-
MENTAL AGREEMEN'T OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951. 
These two points should be considered together 
because appellant bonding company places great 
stress on a theory that a breach by one party binds 
all others. Hartford has received its premium and 
now seeks to escape its liability to the several ob-
ligations on the bond by asserting a breach of con-
tract by one or more of them. Once again, we note 
that absolutely no breach of any contract is asserted 
against the Title Company. 
The project involved over $1,000,000.00 in 
mortgage loans and required a rapid construction 
schedule by the contractor Cassady to complete with-
in the 180 days as agreed upon by it and guaranteed 
by Hartford. When problems arose in the last five 
months or so of 1950, the interested parties con-
ferred. Felt, Cassady & Prudential were the parties 
to the construction contract and the financing pro-
gram. The asserted delay supposedly caused by Felt 
failing to sell the lots to Veterans as soon as they 
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hoped and other minor items, as well as the slowness 
of finances due to the reluctance of eligible Veter-
ans to undertake the purchase of new, but yet un-
built, homes in the face of the Korean situation, the 
inability of Prudential to disburse money until qua-
lified Veteran mortgages had been approved and 
recorded, and all other complaints, including in-
creases in costs for materials, were compromised. 
This was done by the Supplemental Agreement of 
February 16, 1951 (Exh. PR-6) referred to in the 
statement of facts. No material, alleged breaches of 
any type can be shown to have occurred by either 
Felt or Prudential after such date. 
Each of those two litigants, Felt & Prudential 
are filing briefs as to their respective positions and 
we therefore will not attempt to duplicate such mat-
ters. Suffice it to say that there is no evidence 
of the substantial or material asserted breach whic~ 
had not been either justified by the evidence or com-
promised by the February 16, 1951 Supplemental 
Agreement, accede·d to by Hartford. 
If there were any alleged breaches by Felt, no 
legal or actual prejudice to Hartford has been s·hown 
by the evidence. The general rule as stated in 30. 
Am Jur 1115 is that a departure from the contract 
will not have the effect of discharging a compen-
sated surety unless it appears that such departure 
has resulted in injury, loss or prejudice to the sur~ 
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ety- there must be a material variance from the 
contract. 
To take this one step further, we believe that 
the Contract Bond now before the Court cannot be 
read ·to absolve Hartford from its liability to one 
obligee even if another obligee had. failed in its 
responsibilities. As such relates to the Title Com-
pany, the prime contract obligated Cassady to keep 
the premises free·from liens and encumbrances. This 
obligation was then guaranteed and repeated in the 
Contract Bond by Hartford. 
A usual construction bond runs in favor of the 
owner as obligee, but here two additional obligees 
were added because of the importance of the issues, 
Prudential as the "Lender Obligee" and the. Title 
Company as the "Title Obligee". In the preamble, 
the Bond recites that Cassady as "Princip:al" Hart-
ford as "Surety" are held and firmly bound and 
obligated unto the Lender Obligee, the Owner Ob-
ligee and the Title Obligee, "as their respective in-
terests may appear as obligees" in the sum of 
$'763,000.00. Then each Obligee's relationship was 
stated, Title Company being obligated to issue 
A.T.A. title policies on each lot wherein a first mort_-
gage loan was made by Prudential. 
The "NOW, THEREFORE" paragraph recited 
the obligation of the Principal to keep and main-
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tain each lot and building..:site free and clear of 
labor and material liens. Paragraph #3 is the con-
dition under which Hartford seeks an escape from 
liability, it reads: 
"3. 'T·he SURE'TY shall not be liable 
under this Bond to the Obligees, and either 
of them, unless the Obligees, or either of them, 
shall mal\:e payment to the PRINCIPAL in 
reasonable compliance with the terms of said 
contract as to payments, and each shall per-
form all other obligations to be performed by 
each Obligee under said contract at the time 
and in the manner therein set forth." 
Please note that it refers to the prime contract 
only between Felt and Cassidy which was dated July 
19, 1950. The Title Company was not a party to 
said contract and hence had no obligations under it. 
Prudential was not a party to said contract and 
hence had no obligations to perform under· it. 
No evidence is in the record from which it 
could be inferred that the Title Company wa~ ever 
considered obligated to pay the moneys or perform 
the obligations of Felt to Cassady under said con-
tract. Thus the matter of defense raised by the bond-
ing company was never in the contemplation of the 
parties and was impossible of performance by the 
'Title Company. Though Prudential is not a party 
to the prime contract yet it did undertake separately 
to loan moneys to qualified Veteran borrowers upon 
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the security of first lien mortgages, but nothing 
could be inferred whereby the Title Company might 
be construed to be liable to make those mortgage 
loans. 
An ambiguous escape clause is the most that 
can be said for Hartford's defense and appeal. Cer-
tainly the primary covenants and obligations of the 
bond are clear. 
The background of the issuance of the bond, 
to-wit, that the Title Company would not insure the 
mortgages as first liens, against the possibility of 
materialmen's liens unless it was fully indemnified 
by the bond, is likewise uncontested. 
It is contrary to the policy of the law to per-
mit a bonding company to escape from its agreed 
guaranty of performance by the contractor unless 
the terms of the bond giving it an excuse are clear 
and unambiguous and unless the breach complained 
about is su·bstantial and material. Neither situation 
exists here. As between the Title Company and 
Hartford, the Bond was prepared only by Hartford 
and the language used therein is Hartford's langu-
age, and must be construed most strongly against 
it. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS A COMPENSATED SURETY AND 
THE CONTRA'C'T BOND MUST BE CONSTRUED MOST 
STRONGLY AGAINST THE SURETY . 
. On the face of the Bond a premium of $7,630.-
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00 is recited and acknowledged. Hartford therefore 
stands not as a mere voluntary friend who has 
guaranteed performance of a contract, but as a 
compensated, -corporate surety engaged in the busi-
ness of guaranteeing contractual performance. The 
contract of such a compensated surety is construed 
most strongly against it; see 30 Am. Jur. 1112. 
Some rules for construing these surety bonds 
are set out in two Utah cases: H. M. Walker Realty 
Co, v. Americ.an Surety ~Co. 60 Ut. 435, 211 Pac. 998 
and Delux.e Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 Ut 114, 208 
Pac. ( 2d) 1127. In the Walker· case the Court held 
(p. 1010) that as to a surety who makes insurance a 
business, doubtful provisions of a contract are con-
strued in favor of the insured. The Court also re-
peated the rule that recourse may be had to the 
intent of the parties and the existing conditions for 
construing a nagreement of this type. 
Tl1e DeLuxe Glass case further expended the 
rules of construction. The construction contract and 
the surety bond are to be construed together. We 
feel certain that this rule applied to the present 
case will reflect only duties between Felt and Cass-
ady and will not enable Hartford to run away from 
its guaranty of such performance after those two 
parties in February of 1951 compromised their dif-
fer-ences by the Supplemental Agreement, nor infer 
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uncontracted obligations on Title Company or Pru-
dential. 
Little has been said in this brief about the basic 
cause of the debacle, to-wit, Cassady's failure to 
build the 100 houses within 180 days or the extend-
ed period, or to ever complete them in conformance 
with its contract so as to entitle the mortgages there-
on to approval by the U. S. Veteran's Administra-
tion. As appellant, Hartford admits such, but en1-
phasis seems to be shifted to minor, technical, claim-
ed infractions on the part of Felt and Prudential. 
It was Hartford which trusted Cassady to build the 
100 houses according to the V. A. requirements and 
within the time specified. It took a fee and it 
gam·bled and guaranteed that Cassady would per-
form. Felt, Prudential and Title Company did not 
assume that risk. Rather, they relied upon Hart-
ford's performance bond, not upon Cassady. 
Hartford had ample opportunity to protect it-
self prior to writing the bond. It had access to fi-
nancial statements, investigations, indemnifications 
by others and the multiple devices at a compensated 
surety's disposal.. Mter taking all steps and pre-
cautions deeme·d necessary, and a very substantial 
fee, Hartford then underwrote Cassady's perfor-
mance in the manner and time specified by the July 
19, 1950 contract. Then, and only then, did this 
Title Obligee undertake to insure the 1nortgages as 
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and when they were executed and recorded. 
The trial Court found in part, Finding 6 and 
7, (R. Pac. 18) : 
"6. That the defendant as surety exe-
cuted and delivered said Contract Bond to in-
duce the plaintiff to insure the individual 
n1ortgages, that were then about to be execut-
ed on the said one hundred lots and dwelling 
houses, as first liens thereon "\vithout any ex-
ception for the possible liens of materialmen, 
laborers or subcontractors, and to induce 
plaintiff to issue one hundred A.T.A. title 
insurance policies in favor of Prudential Sav~ 
ings and Loan Association showing the sever-
al mortgages as first liens on the respective 
lots. 
7. That in reliance upon said Contract 
Bond and upon the financial responsibility of 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNI-
TY COMPANY as the Surety therein, the 
plaintiff did in fact issue A.T.A. policies of 
title insurance on each and all of the said one 
hundred lots arid dwelling houses in Morning-
side Heights Subdivisions as and when Pru-
dential Federal Savings & Loan Association 
completed a mortgage loan on each of said 
lots and plaintiff did show such mortgage as 
a first lien upon the several lots without any 
exception for possible materialmen's, labor-
ers', or subcontractors' liens against the pro-
perty.'' 
Under the section of American Juris prudence, 
Vol. 9, P. 58, dealing with construction contracts 
and Bonds we find that contractor's bonds such as 
this,." ... will be construed most strongly against a 
compensated surety and in favor of obligee or bene-
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ficiaries under the bond." And at 12 Am. Jur. 795 
we read: 
"§ 252. Interpretation in Favor of One of 
Parties. - Doubtful language in contracts 
should be interpreted most strongly against 
the party who uses it. A written agreement 
should, in case of doubt, be interpreted again-
st the party who has drawn it. Sometimes 
the rule is stated to be that where doubt ex-
ists as to the interpretation of an instrument 
, prepared by one party thereto, upon the faith 
of which the other has incurred an obligation, 
that interpretation will be adopted which will 
be favorable to the latter. It is said that an 
instrument uncertain as to its terms is to be 
most strongly construed against the party 
thereto who causes such uncertainty to exist. 
T'hus, the general rule is that a doubtful or 
ambiguous contract for the professional serv-
ices of the attorney who drew it should be con-
strued in favor of the client. The rule that 
expressions will be interpreted against the 
person using them applies only where, after 
the ordinary rules of interpretation have been 
applied the agreement is still ambiguous. It is 
also said that if other things are equal, an 
interpretation most beneficial to the promisee 
will be adopted when the terms of an instru-
ment and the relationship of the parties leave 
it doubtful whether words are used in an en-
larged or a restricted sense. To state the same 
proposition conversely, it may be said that 
everything is to be taken most strongly 
against the party on whom the obligation of 
the contract rests. Thus it is said that an offer 
and a promise therein contained must be con-
strued most strongly against the offerer." 
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POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE LAW. 
The foregoing summary of the agreed and sti-
pulated facts and the disputed evidence averred to 
above demonstrate that the trial Court had substan-
tial, competent and material evidence before it upon 
which to make the findings of fact. The only direct 
attack upon the Title Company's judgment was upon 
the theory that the damages (stipulated as to 
amount) were admitted but not compensable. We 
have fully answered that in our argument on Point 
I. The collateral attacks by Hartford generally on 
all of the other legal matters have likewise been 
answered above. 
The Trial Court heard the evidence, saw the 
witnesses, listened to the arguments of counsel and 
then rendered judgment in favor of the Title Com-
pany. No sound or justiciable premise has been ad-
vanced to over-throw this judgment. The burden is 
clearly upon Appellant, Hartford, to show clear and 
consistent grounds before a reversal will be granted. 
We urge thlat the findings and judgment of the 
Trial Court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitte·d, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
7·21 Cont'l Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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